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Abstract 
 
Golosov and Lucas (2007) have challenged the view that infrequent price 
adjustments by firms explain why money has aggregate real output effects. 
The basis of their challenge is the ‘selection effect’ – re-setting firms are not 
selected at random, they are those firms whose prices are furthest from the 
optimal reset price. Because of this the aggregate price level is sufficiently 
flexible for monetary neutrality. In this paper I add price review costs to an 
otherwise standard Golosov and Lucas model. This weakens the selection 
effect and restores monetary non-neutrality.  
1 
1. Introduction 
In Golosov and Lucas (GL 2007) money is neutral even when firms, 
facing menu costs, adjust their prices intermittently. They attribute this to a 
‘selection effect’ – the firms that are resetting are those with prices furthest 
from the optimal reset price. In this paper I develop a discrete-time version of 
the GL model in which money is non-neutral. This is due to one very natural 
extension to the GL model: I allow price review costs and the direct costs of 
changing prices to play distinct roles in the pricing decision. The former are 
incurred when information is gathered and processed, and when decisions are 
made; the latter (‘menu costs’), are incurred only when prices are changed. 
The distinction is important because there is substantial evidence that firms 
review their prices intermittently and the change them less frequently than 
they review them.  
The effect of review costs on the firm’s pricing strategy has been 
analyzed in an expanding number of recent papers (reviewed below). My aim 
in this paper is to embed both review costs and menu costs in an otherwise 
standard menu-cost model and examine the effect this has on the strength of 
the selection effect. I find that this extension to the standard model sufficiently 
weakens the selection effect to give a degree of money non-neutrality similar 
to that of Reis’s (2006) ‘inattentiveness’ model.  
Money is non-neutral when the aggregate price level is slow to adjust. 
Such price-level stickiness has been attributed to costs associated with 
changing prices. The presence of such costs provided new-Keynesians with 
the micro-foundation that earlier Keynesian models lacked. And yet the new-
Keynesian analysis of monetary policy is usually based on the simplifying 
2 
assumption of Calvo (1983): firms choose how much to change prices but not 
when.1 Their timing is random. New-Keynesians are left with the hope that the 
Calvo approach is close enough an approximation to a fully-specified menu-
cost model to justify its use for the analysis of monetary policy. Unfortunately 
the standard menu-cost model, appropriately calibrated to match the micro-
data, behaves rather unlike the Calvo model and the micro-foundations of 
Keynesian monetary policy would seem to be far from established. 
In Caplin and Spulber’s (1987) early menu-cost model, money is 
completely neutral because of the selection effect.2 Firms that are re-setting 
are not drawn randomly – they are those with prices furthest from the optimal 
reset price. Consider the effects of a positive monetary shock. Those firms 
with initial prices well below their equilibrium will reset and, when they do so, 
make large adjustments (to catch up). Firms with prices nearer their 
equilibrium values or even some way above them are unlikely to reset. The 
aggregate price level is an average of the large price adjustments of the re-
setters and the zero adjustments of others. In Caplin and Spulber’s model the 
average price level exactly keeps pace with the monetary shock, neutralising 
any aggregate real output effects. They show that while there may be firm-
level stickiness in prices, the aggregate price level is not and, because of this, 
money is neutral.  
GL find that the selection effect is also present in their fully-specified 
menu-cost model with idiosyncratic productivity. Calibrating their model to 
                                                 
1
 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) is a comprehensive survey of the new-Keynesian analysis 
of monetary policy based on the Calvo approach. 
2
 Golosov and Lucas (2007) first coined the phrase ‘selection effect’. Caballero and Engel 
(2007) argue that the key distinction is that between the ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ margins. In 
the former a money shock raises the price level through its effect on the fraction of firms 
making price adjustments. The intensive margin is the additional price increases of those 
firms that were going to adjust anyway. Only the intensive margin is active in the Calvo 
model, while in menu-cost models both margins are strictly positive. 
3 
match observed patterns of price setting (as described in Bils and Klenow 
(2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)), they find that the selection effect 
blunts the real effects of money – not completely, but substantially so. 
Acknowledging that the menu cost model can explain price stickiness at the 
firm level, GL argue that it does not explain stickiness of the aggregate price 
level. 
The standard menu-cost model can be challenged along two related 
lines. First it is simply not consistent with observed patterns of price changes 
in the micro data. And secondly, its description of the price-setting process 
and its associated costs is seriously incomplete. The first weakness concerns 
the failure of the standard model to account for the wide dispersion of price 
changes observed in the data. According to Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), the 
average absolute change in those prices being re-set is around 10% and yet 
they find that 44% of price changes are less than 5% in absolute value. Since, 
in the standard menu-cost model, prices only adjust when they are some way 
from their equilibrium values, small price adjustments are only made if menu-
costs are small – too small for the model to remain consistent with other 
features of the data.  
Recent menu-cost models have been more successful in explaining the 
wide dispersion of price changes in the survey data. Several introduce some 
form of heterogeneity in menu costs. Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) 
assume that menu costs are stochastic so that those firms with small menu 
costs will adjust prices even when current prices are close to the equilibrium. 
Dotsey, King and Wolman (2006) add idiosyncratic shocks to their earlier 
model, generating the large price changes observed in the data. Klenow and 
4 
Kryvtsov (2008) assume fixed but different menu costs specific to 67 sectors. 
Small price adjustments will be made by firms in sectors with low menu costs. 
Similarly, Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) develop a multi-sector model in 
which menu-costs (and therefore price-resetting frequencies and their size) 
vary by sector. Midrigan (2011) adds two extensions to the standard model: 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to have fat-tailed distributions; 
and output is produced by multi-product firms so that there are ‘economies of 
scope’ in adjusting prices.3 Firms re-set all prices when optimisation requires 
re-setting only one.4 With the combination of fat-tailed productivity shocks and 
economies of scope, Midrigan explains both the large mean of absolute price 
changes and the frequency of small ones. This sufficiently weakens the 
selection effect to generate real effects of money similar to those in models 
with Calvo pricing. Finally Gertler and Leahy (2008) have developed a model 
with Poisson arrival of uniformly-distributed idiosyncratic productivity shocks 
and small menu costs, so that many price changes are small. 
These ‘second generation’ menu-cost models (to borrow Klenow and 
Kryvtsov’s term for them) have successfully modified the standard model to 
account for the mean size and wide dispersion of price changes in the data. 
And in doing so, they find that the selection effect is weak enough for money 
to have real effects comparable to those of the Calvo model.5 Collectively they 
suggest that the new-Keynesian analysis of monetary policy, based as it is on 
                                                 
3
 Midrigan also seeks to explain the difference between ‘regular’ and ‘posted’ prices and the 
interesting observation that 86% of temporary nominal prices return to their original values. 
Although temporary price adjustments by firms may reduce the real effects of money, 
Midrigan finds this to be relatively unimportant. 
4 To support his use of scope economies, Midrigan cites Lach and Tsiddon (2007) who 
present evidence that economies of scope in price setting may account for the fact that some 
price changes are small. 
5
 Indeed Gertler and Leahy obtain a closed-form solution that is identical to that of the new-
Keynesian model based on Calvo pricing, though obviously the parameters have a different 
interpretation in their case. 
5 
Calvo pricing, may yet be a reasonable approximation to an analysis with 
sounder micro foundations. 
The second weakness of the standard menu-cost model concerns its 
characterisation of the price-setting process and its associated costs. This is 
the focus of this paper. Standard menu-cost models typically assume that 
firms costlessly and continuously review their prices and change them only if 
the menu costs are justified. They largely ignore the costs of gathering and 
processing the relevant information and the costs of the pricing decision itself 
– collectively price review costs.6 Firm surveys find two features which 
challenge the standard model. First, firms review their prices intermittently, not 
continuously, adjusting them less frequently than reviewing. Secondly review 
costs are substantially higher than the direct costs of physically changing 
prices.7  
In analyzing the impact of review costs and menu costs in an otherwise 
standard menu-cost model, the distinction between state- and time-dependent 
pricing becomes blurred. In the model developed in this paper, firms are 
assumed to set the date of the next review when reviewing their prices (and 
possibly changing them). This date is chosen optimally given the current state 
variables. Although the firm’s pricing behaviour is purely state-dependent, one 
of its choice variables is the date of the next review. Time- and state-
                                                 
6
 Alvarez et al (2011), Woodford (2009) and others refer to these costs as ‘information’ costs. 
My preference is for the wider term ‘review costs’ to stress the fact that it covers information 
gathering, information processing, decision-making – the costs of all activities involved in 
pricing decisions.  
7
 In motivating his inattentiveness model, Reis (2006) went so far as to claim that ‘with the 
exception of magazine prices and restaurant menus, for most products it is difficult to identify 
any significant fixed physical costs of changing prices’ (p.793). 
6 
dependency are interwoven. In Midrigan (2010) he asks: ‘Is firm pricing state- 
or time-dependent?’ 8 My answer is both.9 
Price reviews and price adjustments are both costly exercises and will, 
for that reason, occur infrequently. The standard menu-cost model and its 
second-generation extensions assume that review costs and price adjustment 
costs are always incurred together. The evidence suggests otherwise. Price 
reviews are more frequent than adjustments - not all reviews lead to a change 
in price.10 Hall et al (2000) find that the median firm in their UK survey 
changed prices twice a year but reviewed prices every month (only 17% of 
reviews change prices). Using Euro-area data, Fabiani et al (2006) find that 
‘the modal number of price reviews ranges in most countries between one and 
three times per year, while the median firm in nearly all countries changes its 
price only once a year’. Alvarez et al (2011) review the survey evidence 
across a number of European and North American countries. They conclude: 
‘The median firm in the Euro area reviews its price a bit less than three times 
a year, but changes its price only about once a year, and similar for UK and 
US.’ More precisely the median US firm reviews its price twice a year and 
changes it 1.4 times, suggesting that 30% of reviews do not lead to a change 
                                                 
8 Midrigan’s own answer is state-dependent, at least in US manufacturing. Yet he also makes 
clear that ‘the terms time- and state-dependent pricing are somewhat obscured by the 
richness, in recent work, of models with nominal rigidities that employ elements of both of 
these price setting mechanisms.’ 
9
 The fact that state- and time-dependency are closely interconnected may explain why firms 
have responded differently when asked directly about their pricing strategies. Fabiani et al 
(2006) investigate the pricing behaviour of more than 11,000 firms in the euro area on the 
basis of surveys conducted by nine Eurosystem national central banks. They find that ‘around 
one-third of the respondents indicate that they follow mainly time-dependent rules, while two-
thirds use rules with state-dependent elements’. In their analysis of 654 UK companies in a 
Bank of England survey, Hall et al (2000) report that ‘time-dependent pricing was more 
common than state-dependent pricing, with 79% of the respondents reporting that they 
reviewed their prices at a specific frequency’. Analysing similar data for the US, Blinder et al 
(1998) observe that 60% of their respondents said that they had ‘periodic price reviews’ 
(which they interpret as a time-dependent pricing strategy). 
10
 It is possible for price adjustments to be more frequent than reviews. This would be the 
case if prices were indexed. It would also be the case if, following a review, a time-schedule 
of prices was set in place, as analysed by Burstein (2006). 
7 
in price. Because of likely measurement errors associated with the median, 
Alvarez et al focus on the mass of US firms reviewing or changing their prices 
more than four times a year. Only 37% of these reviews led to price changes. 
There is, then, substantial variation across countries and firms in the 
proportion of reviews that lead to price changes, but reviews are always more 
frequent than changes.  
Allowing review costs and menu costs to play distinctive roles in price 
setting helps to solve two puzzles: why so many price changes are small and 
why firms only review their prices intermittently. Reviews are infrequent 
because they are costly. The cost of actually changing price is substantially 
lower and, because of this, firms will find it profitable to change price following 
a review even when only marginal adjustments are called for.  
Related Literature 
Information and decision costs play a more central role (than menu 
costs) in recent models of price stickiness. Reis (2006) has shown that a 
producer who faces costs of acquiring, absorbing and processing information 
will be rationally ‘inattentive to news, only sporadically updating his or her 
information.’ Reis suggests that since the costs of processing information are 
likely to exceed the cost of the information itself, the firm will still review 
intermittently even if free information were available.11 I follow Reis in 
explaining inattention (periodic price reviews) as a result of information costs 
and I embed this feature in a general equilibrium model which also allows 
menu costs to influence the firm’s pricing decision. The GL menu-cost and 
                                                 
11
 Mankiw and Reis (2007) argue that inattention can be justified either by information costs or 
by appealing to epidemiology (Carroll (2006)). 
8 
Reis inattentiveness models are nested as special cases within my more 
general model.  
Alvarez et al (2011) obtain interesting analytical results from a model 
that allows the firm’s pricing strategy to be influenced by both review costs 
and menu-costs. They argue that the observed micro evidence on price-
setting (including the frequencies of price reviews and price changes) can 
potentially be explained using the level and relative magnitudes of review and 
menu costs. The model in this paper is similar in spirit to theirs but my 
analysis of the two costs is set in a general equilibrium framework designed to 
analyse the aggregate real effects of monetary shocks.  
Information costs also play an important role in Woodford’s (2009) model 
which is similar in spirit to that developed in this paper. Firms pay for a noisy 
signal (of current market conditions) and, using this signal, they decide 
whether or not to review their price. When the signal leads to a review, the 
firm gathers the complete set of information that is required to set a new price, 
a price which stays in effect until the next review. Although price-setting is 
purely state-dependent, the model’s macroeconomic implications are similar 
to those of a Calvo model. The timing of price reviews in Woodford’s model 
relies on a low-cost signal. In the model I develop in this paper, the date of the 
next review is set endogenously as part of the current review. Woodford’s 
model fails to explain why the frequency of price reviews in the data exceeds 
that of price adjustments since, in his analysis, prices are always adjusted 
when a review takes place. There are no direct costs of changing prices, just 
information costs. And if (as Reis (2006) has hinted) review costs are 
dominated by decision costs, the role of the information signal is less clear. 
9 
In Costain and Nákov (2011) the probability of price adjustment is a 
smooth function of the value of making that adjustment. This function is 
parameterised such that Calvo and GL price adjustments emerge as special 
cases. Calibrating their model to match the AC Nielsen dataset (described in 
Midrigan (2011)), they find that the behaviour of their ‘estimated model is 
much closer to that of a Calvo model’. In the model developed here, the value 
of making the price adjustment is not known without incurring a review cost. 
Costain and Nákov find support for a Calvo pricing mechanism precisely 
because, in the data used to calibrate the model, time must play a role. The 
underlying reasons for this feature are the focus of the model developed here. 
Recognizing that state-dependency creates a selection effect that time-
dependent schemes do not, Knotek (2010) develops a model in which the firm 
is assumed to review its prices intermittently and change them only if menu-
costs suggest a change to be worthwhile. But price reviews occur randomly 
with a probability that is independent of the date of the last review. In the 
model developed here the date of the next review is set optimally as part of 
the current review. Gorodnichenko (2008) explains infrequent reviews through 
information externalities – firms acquire information from price changes of 
others. The information externality and menu costs reinforce each other in 
delaying price adjustments and this leads to sticky aggregate prices. 
Bonomo and Carvalho (2004, 2010) also focus on information costs in a 
model that treats the price contract length as endogenous. As in the model 
developed here, they stress the importance of the costs of information 
gathering, decision-making and internal communication. And at each 
(infrequent) review date, the firm decides on the next review date – an 
10 
assumption I also adopt. They show that the interval between reviews is 
increasing in the real costs of gathering and processing information and/or 
adjusting its prices. My focus in this paper is the strength of the selection 
effect when review costs add a time dimension to firms’ pricing. To do this I 
analyse the separate roles played by review costs and menu costs, the latter 
only incurred when prices are actually changed. Bonomo and Carvalho (in 
both papers) assume that review costs and menu costs are always incurred 
together.  
Bonomo, Carvalho and Garcia (2010) allow review costs and menu 
costs to play separate roles in pricing behaviour. Firms have the option to 
adjust or not following a review, menu costs being incurred only if an 
adjustment takes place. They also allow price adjustments to take place 
without any review (uninformed adjustment), so that firms only incur menu 
costs. The possibility of uninformed price changes (even in the presence of 
menu costs) is an interesting extension to the standard approach. I apply the 
central ideas of the Bonomo, Carvalho and Garcia model to analyse the 
quantitative, general equilibrium strength (or otherwise) of the selection effect 
when time plays a role in price-setting behaviour.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the following section I 
identify seven key features of the micro data, features which the review-cost 
model should explain. In section 3 I extend GL’s model to allow review and 
menu costs to exert separate influences on the firm’s pricing decision. The 
main results are presented and discussed in section 4 and a final section 
offers a summary and conclusion. 
  
11 
2 The Micro Evidence 
Three recent papers have analysed datasets on firms’ pricing behaviour. 
Midrigan (2011) – henceforth M – uses a dataset of scanner price data, 
maintained by the Kilts Center for Marketing. at the University of Chicago 
Graduate School of Business.12 The prices are those set by one retail 
company, Dominick’s Finer Foods, covering 9,000 products in 86 stores in the 
Chicago area. M’s data are weekly. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and 
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) – henceforth KK and NS respectively – 
analyse monthly price data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for 
the Consumer Price Index. There are many technical issues that lead M, KK, 
and NS to arrive at (slightly) different conclusions but the main features of 
their data can be conveniently summarised in the following seven 
observations. 
1. Price changes are more frequent than once imagined. KK find that 
consumer prices are changed every 4–7 months depending on the 
treatment of temporary price changes. NS find median durations of 
between 8 and 12 months for ‘regular’ (non-sale) prices. For model 
calibration I use a reset frequency target of 8.7% per month - the figure 
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 Midrigan focuses on the distinction between posted and regular prices. I calibrate using the 
moments of regular price changes only. Midrigan and Kehoe (2010) show that 72% of all 
price changes are temporary in nature, and half of these return to the level set before the 
temporary change. So while the overall frequency of price changes is large (22% of all prices 
change each month), the frequency of regular price changes is much smaller (7% per month). 
They find that temporary price changes cannot offset monetary shocks well, whereas regular 
changes can. The fact that temporary prices quickly return to their original levels suggests 
that in calibrating models of the sort I develop in this paper, it is the frequency and size of 
regular price changes that is relevant for calibration. 
12 
reported by NS for prices excluding sales and substitutions for the 
period 1998-2005.13  
2. Many of the price changes that do occur are large in absolute value. 
KK report that the median absolute change in regular prices is around 
10%; NS find the median absolute change in prices to be a little lower 
at 8.5%, which is the target I use in model calibration. NS find that 
median fraction of regular price changes that are increases is 64.8%, a 
feature I also use in model calibration.14 
3. Notwithstanding (2), KK and M find that a significant number of price 
changes are small. KK report that 44% are less than 5% in absolute 
value, M reporting a lower figure of 25%. M estimates the standard 
deviation of regular price changes to be 8%, 25% of changes are less 
than half the mean and 8% are less than a quarter of the mean. There 
is, then, considerable dispersion in the distribution of price changes. 
4. Even for individual items, price durations vary considerably over time.15 
KK report that the standard deviation of completed ‘contract lengths’ is 
7 months within ‘ELIs’ and 5.2 months within ‘quote lines’.16 
5. KK find that the size of absolute price changes is not related to the 
interval of time since they were last re-set. I report (below) the 
correlation between the absolute change in reset prices and the time 
                                                 
13
 See NS Table II. This table also highlights the substantial heterogeneity in re-setting 
frequency across sectors, from close to 90% per month in vehicle fuels to only 3.6% in 
clothing. Because of this the mean reset frequency is substantially higher than the median. 
14
 See NS Table II (incidence of price increases) and VIII (median absolute price change). KK 
find that 57% are increases. The difference is that KK report the mean fraction, whereas NS 
report the median. 
15
 Dixon and Kara (2010) develop a ‘Generalized Taylor’ model in which contract periods vary 
across firms but not over time. Their model thus fails to explain the fourth feature of the micro 
data. 
16
 ELIs are entry-level items, and quote lines are particular items within the ELIs.  
13 
since they were last reset as   . The data suggests this should be 
small. 
6. KK report that the intensive margin (the size of price changes) rather 
than the extensive margin (the fraction of items with price changes) 
dominates variations in inflation. They report the correlation (  ) 
between inflation and the fraction of prices being re-set to be 0.25 and 
the correlation (  ) between inflation and average change in reset 
prices to be 0.99. 
7. The last feature of the price data concerns the relative frequencies of 
price reviews and price adjustments: not all reviews lead to 
adjustments. As we have seen, Alvarez et al (2011) report substantial 
survey variation in the fraction of reviews that are followed by price 
adjustments. However, the qualitative evidence is clear - there are 
always more reviews than there are adjustments. 
KK demonstrate that standard state- and time-dependent pricing models 
fail to explain one or more of these features of the micro data. Second 
generation state-dependent models have been more successful, but none 
explain why price reviews are intermittent and more frequent than price 
adjustments. The extended GL model I develop in the next section does just 
that.  
  
14 
3. A Model with Review Costs and Menu Costs 
In this section I add review costs into an otherwise standard GL menu-cost 
model. I begin with a description of a discrete-time (monthly) version of their 
model. 
The Standard Menu-Cost Model 
Households consume a continuum of differentiated products, of unit measure, 
indexed z. The Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz composite consumption good takes the 
now-familiar form, 
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 In the GL model the process for the log of the economy-wide wage rate is also that of the 
log of the money supply. Hence wage inflation and money-supply growth are identical. 
15 
The presence of tc  in (2) means that, strictly, it should be treated as a state-
variable but its behaviour (from (3)) depends on the entire distribution of all 
firms’ prices. GL conjecture that if wage inflation were constant, (3) would be a 
time-invariant constant at some level .c  They find that the constant-c
assumption is a good approximation in their case, even for a model with 
stochastic wage inflation. Stopping at the mean may be an approximation too 
far given the extensions I add to the GL model and for this reason I allow tc  
to vary (as I explain below). 
The firm’s profit function is, 
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where )(zIt  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm changes 
its price in period t and zero otherwise; k is the real menu cost – the hours of 
labour needed to change price; and )(zv t is labour productivity in firm z.
18 
Expressed in units of the money wage, using equation (2), 
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the real product wage) of good z.  
The wage rate ( tw ) and idiosyncratic productivity ( )(zv t ) are assumed 
to follow, 
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 The firm’s output is a function of labour alone. 
16 
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Following Krusell and Smith (1998) I make the firm’s problem tractable by 
assuming that they perceive tc  to be a function of a small number of its 
moments (not just its mean as in GL). In particular I assume, 
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I explain the calibration of the   coefficients below. The firm maximizes profits 
discounted at a constant rate β so that the real value (V) function of the firm is 
given by the solution to the Bellman equation, 
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There are three state variables, tt wzp /)(1 , )(zvt  
and tc . This is 
because profits are a function only of these three variables and the choice 
variable );(zpt  and the future values of tt wzp /)(1 , )(zv t  and tc  depend 
only on their current values, the choice variable and the future shocks. I solve 
the firm’s problem (6) by value function iteration on a grid, and approximate 
the processes for )(zv t  and tc  using a method suggested by Tauchen 
(1986).19 
The parameters in equation (5) are obtained numerically. Step 1: I 
generate simulated values for tw , and )(zv t  for 2,000 months and over 5,000 
                                                 
19
 The solution method used is similar to that adopted by NS. They helpfully provided the 
Matlab programmes they used in their paper. My own Matlab codes are available on request. 
17 
firms. Step 2: I guess an initial set of parameters for equation (5). Step 3: I 
solve equation (6) conditional on the assumed process for tc . Step 4: I obtain 
solutions for all firms’ real prices )(zxt  and, I find the values of tc  (for each 
month) by numerically solving the fixed point problem,20 
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(3a) 
Step 5: Using the updated tc , I obtain revised estimates of the parameters of 
equation (5) and repeat steps 3 through 5 until the   coefficients have 
converged.21 
The implied assumption of GL’s profit function (4) is that price-reviews 
are continuous and costless. Each month, in the discrete-time version of their 
model, the firm costlessly determines the equilibrium price and incurs a menu-
cost only if the price is actually adjusted. There are no costs associated with 
information gathering, information processing and the pricing decision itself.  
 
A Menu-Cost Model with Review Costs 
Now consider the case where price reviews are costly. I re-write the profit 
function as, 
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20
 Equation (3a) is solved by a simple iterative procedure. First guess a value for ct, solve 
firms’ real prices given this value, update ct from (3a) and continue until convergence. 
21
 More precisely, convergence is achieved when the values of and the standard 
deviation of (et) assumed in step 3 are unchanged in step 5. 
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)(zJt  is an indicator variable that takes the value one if prices are reviewed 
that month and zero otherwise; kq 
 
is the review cost and is the ratio of 
the price review cost to the menu cost.22 I assume that price changes can only 
occur when reviews take place: 0)( zIt  if 0)( zJt . When a review does 
take place )1)(( zJt , )(zIt can be zero or one.  
Price reviews are now likely to be intermittent, the more so with higher 
values for . In Woodford (2009) firms always change prices when a full 
review is suggested by the signal of market conditions. If no such signal were 
available (or available at infinite cost), how should the firm behave? Consider 
a firm that makes three decisions in every price review: (i) should it change its 
price? (ii) what price to set if (i) is affirmative; and (iii) when next to review. 
Dropping the firm index for notational convenience, the real value function of 
the firm can then be written as, 
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There are now two choice variables: the firm’s price and the time interval 
(T) to the next review. The optimal interval is allowed to vary with time-t state 
variables  tttt cvwp ,,/1  and hence it carries a time subscript.
23 The GL 
model is obtained as special case by simply setting to zero. In this case 
1tT  for all t. Setting 0k  and 0q , the model collapses to a discrete-time 
                                                 
22
 We know that there is, in the data, considerable heterogeneity in review intervals, 
suggesting that might also vary across firms. In this paper I limit myself to constant menu 
costs and review costs. Allowing both some measure of heterogeneity will further strengthen 
the model’s ability to capture features of the micro-data. 
23
 Bonomo and Carvalho (2004, 2010) assume the time interval is constant for any given 
monetary policy regime and analyze its change over time when a regime switch occurs. 
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version of Reis (2006). In this sense the model developed here has GL and 
Reis models as polar cases, GL by assuming zero review costs and Reis by 
assuming zero menu costs. In the interval between reviews, the firm’s relative 
price will be expected to decline by the anticipated rate of wage inflation.  
Like Woodford, I do not allow for price indexation or the possibility of 
‘uninformed price adjustments’ (as in Bonomo, Carvalho and Garcia (2010)).24 
Alvarez et al (2011) show that ‘price plans’ are not optimal when the inflation 
rate is low (as it is in the model calibrated below). Hence it is reasonable to 
assume that nominal prices remain unchanged between reviews.25 Also like 
Woodford I make the implicit assumption that no costless information is 
available.26 The arrival of such information (whether idiosyncratic or 
aggregate) may well lead firms to bring forward the date of the planned 
review. So it might seem natural to allow firms the opportunity to re-schedule 
review dates following the arrival of free new information. Re-scheduled 
reviews are very likely to be followed by price adjustments as their timing is 
triggered by new information. A model that allows for re-scheduling thus 
collapses to a menu-cost model in which price reviews and price adjustments 
are coincident. It might be possible to imagine firms re-scheduling following 
big informational surprises but this would complicate the model without much 
in return. In common with other recent contributions, I therefore assume that 
                                                 
24
 One can sensibly interpret uninformed price adjustments in terms of Midrigan and Kehoe’s 
(2010) temporary price changes. Since I calibrate on the moments of regular price changes 
(as Midrigan and Kehoe recommend), such uninformed price changes can be ignored. 
25
 The Alvarez et al result suggests that the model developed here would not be appropriate 
for analysing the effects of inflation. 
26
 For example Bonomo, Carvalho and Garcia (2010) analyse the case where freely-available 
information about the aggregate price level may lead firms to index their own prices. The 
authors admit that this is only a ‘realistic representation of price and wage setting rules during 
periods of very high inflation.’ 
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the costs of re-scheduling review dates are prohibitive.27 I also ignore the 
possibility that reviews may lead to a change in price but not in the same 
month. Ideally the decision to change prices in the month the review takes 
place and to keep them fixed between reviews is one that should be based on 
the firm’s optimising behaviour, rather than exogenously imposed. In this 
paper I focus on only one extension to the standard menu-cost approach: that 
of review costs and their effect on monetary non-neutrality. Other extensions 
will doubtless follow. 
Review intervals are assumed to be whole months. When the review 
takes place, prices are not always adjusted, so the frequency of reviews will 
always exceed the frequency of price changes, as it does in survey data.  
The presence of review costs weakens the selection effect. This is 
because as review costs rise, menu-costs must be lower to match the target 
reset frequency. When menu-costs play no role (the inattention model), the 
firms that are re-setting are not those with prices furthest from the optimal 
reset price and the selection effect disappears (as in Calvo (1983), Reis 
(2006) and Mankiw and Reis (2002)).28 And price changes will occur at preset 
but state-dependent intervals. When menu-costs play some role in pricing 
decisions, the selection effect will be weaker than in the GL model with 
monthly reviews. My aim is to evaluate how much weaker. 
Integrating (2) defines aggregate real output, 
                                                 
27
 Reis (2006) has also argued that firms will still review intermittently even if free information 
were available. This would be the case if review costs were dominated by processing and 
decision costs, rather than the cost of information itself. 
28
 Knotek (2010) describes the weaker selection effect in these terms: ‘Infrequent information 
updating in a state-dependent pricing model mitigates this selection effect, since firms do not 
always know exactly how their price compares with their optimal price’ (pp1544-5) 
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I define the output gap (g) as,29 
)~log()log( ttt yyg   
and the (monthly) inflation rate as   
1
0
1 ))(log())(log( dzzpzp tt . 
 
Model Calibration 
I follow GL in the choice of many of the parameters of the model: the risk 
aversion parameter,    2; the elasticity of substitution,    7; the disutility of 
work,    6. GL give their reasons for the values selected. And I follow NS in 
my choice of (monthly) discount rate,   0.9966 and in the parameters of the 
wage (equivalently, money) process,    0.0021 and     0.0032, implying an 
average annual wage-money growth rate of around 3%.  
                                                 
29
 An alternative definition of the aggregate output gap would be to take the mean over all 
firms’ gaps. The time average of this measure would be zero. The mean of g over time is 
typically negative since (by Jensen’s inequality), the difference in means is not equal to the 
mean of differences. 
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A key parameter is clearly implicitly zero in GL. Alvarez et al (2011) identify 
two ‘observable statistics’ that provide direct evidence about  . The first is the 
ratio of adjustment to review frequencies, but, as we have seen, the survey 
evidence on this ratio shows too much variation to pin down a calibration 
target for  . Alvarez et al also show that the ratio of the mode to the mean size 
of price change is a monotone function of  .30 I find that the ratio of the mean 
to the median price change also varies with  . KK report that this ratio is 1.165 
in their micro-data and I therefore calibrate   to match it. 
I follow NS in the calibration of the remaining three parameters (k,   and 
  ). They were chosen to match the following micro-data features reported by 
NS and outlined in section 2: 
 The frequency of price changes is 8.7% per month. 
 The average absolute price changes that do occur is 8.5%  
 64.8% of price changes were increases.31 
I then compare each model’s performance in matching the remaining features 
described in section 2.32 
4. Results 
The calibration parameters and targets of five models are given in Table 1, the 
GL model and four review-cost variants, including the Reis ‘inattention’ polar 
case. Tables 2 and 3 report the simulation results, the first covering pricing 
behaviour and the second the macroeconomic implications. Consider first the 
                                                 
30
 In Alvarez et al the ratio of the mode to mean absolute price change is an increasing 
monotone function of the ratio of menu-costs to the ‘observation’ cost. In my model this 
implies that the ratio of mean to median price changes might rise with    as it does. 
31
 The percentage of price increases in all models was close enough to target by setting to 
0.72. 
32 GL calibrate the same three parameters on the frequency of price changes, the mean size 
of absolute price change and standard deviation of prices that change. They target a re-set 
frequency of 21.9% without distinguishing regular and sale prices.  
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standard menu-cost model (GL). In this model    0, so price reviews take 
place costlessly each month, the firm incurring menu-costs only when prices 
are actually changed. Predictably the standard menu-cost model fails to 
account for the substantial dispersion in price changes (Table 2). The 
percentage of small price changes is well short of that found in the data: only 
0.1% of price changes are less 5% compared with 25% in M’s data.  
From Table 3  tclog  follows an AR(1) process with the current 
innovation influenced to some degree by the money-wage shock.33 Both 
extensive      and intensive      margins are positive, the former less than 
the latter. The extensive margin is, however, too strong – 0.62 compared with 
0.25 reported by KK. The GL model generates a very weak business cycle 
and money is close to being neutral. The former is reflected in the low 
standard deviation of the output gap, g . In a fashion similar to GL, I analyse 
the impact of money on aggregate real output through a regression of the 
simulated output gap on its lag and the current growth rate of the money 
supply (or equivalently, nominal wages). The coefficient on the money wage 
shock is 0.263 (0.002) using monthly simulated data.34  
To summarize: in the monthly discrete-time version of GL’s standard 
menu-cost model, money is close to being neutral through the selection effect, 
but the model fails to capture the substantial dispersion in price changes 
observed in the data. 
                                                 
33
 GL allow for no time variation in the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate (i.e. R
2
 = 0). Although 
equation (5) is an obvious improvement on GL's constant-c approach, the accuracy gain is 
marginal since, as GL argue, aggregate shocks play a relatively minor role in the firm's pricing 
decision compared with idiosyncratic shocks.  
34
 GL regress quarterly output on wage inflation alone and obtain a coefficient of 0.05. I derive 
quarterly time aggregations of the monthly simulations and in a regression of the quarterly 
output gap on wage inflation alone I obtain a coefficient of 0.17. 
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Four variants of the review-cost model are presented. In the first three 
menu costs are positive with the following values for    0.5, 1 and 7. In the 
fourth case menu costs are zero and review costs positive (corresponding to 
Reis’s inattentiveness case). As the ratio of review costs to menu costs rises, 
the mean review interval lengthens: from 4 months when    0.5 to over 8 
months when    7 (Table 2). When firms incur no menu costs the mean 
review interval is close to one year. And the standard deviation of review 
intervals rises from 0.15 months when    0.5, to 0.77 months when    7 
and 3.4 months when menu-costs are zero. When   = 0.5 and reviews are 
most frequent, only 35% of them lead to price changes. This rises to 72% 
when   = 7 and close to 100% in the inattentiveness case.35 Across all review-
cost models, the correlation between the size of the price change and the time 
is was last re-set ( 1 ) is negative but weak.
36 
The ratio of mean to median absolute price change rises with   and 
when    7 this ratio matches that in the data (Table 1). This benchmark case 
is broadly consistent with the direct evidence reported in Zbaracki et al 
(2004).37 And, from the results presented in Table 2, the benchmark model 
alone succeeds in capturing the distribution of reset intervals, with a standard 
deviation of 6.6 months lying within the range found in the data (5-7 months). 
The benchmark model also explains the wide dispersion of price adjustments 
and it is this that is crucial in reducing the selection effect as Midrigan (2011) 
has recently demonstrated. He argues that the ‘strength of the selection effect 
depends on the measure of the marginal firms whose desired price changes 
                                                 
35
 In the inattentive case firms will always adjust as they incur no cost in doing so. On a small 
number of occasions the adjustment required is zero. 
36
 The correlation is weak and positive in KK’s data. 
37
 Zbaracki et al (2004) report that ‘managerial costs are more than 6 times … the physical 
costs associated with changing prices’ (p. 515). 
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lie in the neighbourhood of the adjustment thresholds’. When this is relatively 
large, as in GL, the distribution of price changes is bimodal, showing little 
dispersion. The kernel density function38 for non-zero price changes shown in 
Figure 1 clearly shows this is the case for the GL model. The bimodal 
densities are steeply peaked close to the re-set thresholds. When the 
measure of marginal firms is small, most firms are dispersed away from their 
adjustment thresholds, price changes are more widely dispersed and the 
selection effect is weaker. That price changes are more widely dispersed in 
the case of the review cost model is again clear from Figure 1 (shown for the 
case of   = 7), though the distribution of prices in the review-cost model is still 
bimodal, unlike that of prices in the Dominick’s data analysed by Midrigan. 
The key macroeconomic implications of review costs are set out in Table 
3. Compared with the GL model, there is more serial correlation in the 
behaviour of  tclog  and it is more responsive to innovations in the money 
wage. The R2 of the approximation for  tclog  is 0.986 for the benchmark 
case      . In GL’s original model an R2 of zero was argued to be sufficient 
since variations in tc in their case were small and had a minor effect on the 
firm’s pricing behaviour. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Midrigan (2011) 
also apply the Krussel and Smith approach and they report R2s of 0.98. The 
R2s in Table 3 are similar to theirs.  
The benchmark model alone succeeds in capturing the roles of the 
extensive ( 2 ) and intensive ( 3 ) margins of inflation. The standard deviation 
of the output gap for the benchmark model is over 3 times that of the GL 
                                                 
38
 I used the Gaussian kernel density function in STATA version 11. 
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model.39 The review-cost model sufficiently weakens the selection effect to 
strengthen monetary non-neutrality, as the output-gap regressions illustrate. 
As review costs become increasingly important, the impact of money on the 
output gap increases, though persistence following the shock eventually 
declines with higher values of  .40 . Even when the review cost is only half the 
size of the menu cost, monetary non-neutrality is significantly more 
pronounced than in the standard menu-cost case.  
Figure 2 plots impulse-responses implied by the output gap regressions 
reported in Table 3. The benchmark model and Reis’s inattentiveness model 
have very similar implications for monetary non-neutrality. The figure also 
plots the response of a Calvo model calibrated to match the frequency of price 
changes but one that shares the same idiosyncratic and monetary shocks as 
the benchmark model. The contemporaneous impact of a monetary shock on 
the output gap is similar for all review-cost models and the Calvo model, but 
the effects are far more persistent in the latter.41 Although the impact of 
money on the output gap is similar in the benchmark and Calvo models, the 
models are likely to have very different wider policy implications. For example 
the effect of a doubling of the variance of the money shock is likely to be very 
different in the benchmark model, where firms have the option to adjust the 
timing of their next review. In the Calvo model firms do have this option.42  
                                                 
39
 The standard deviation of the output gap is 0.34% for   = 7, close to Midrigan’s (2011) 
consumption standard deviation of 0.29% for his benchmark case. 
40
 Results not reported suggest that persistence is greatest when   = 2. 
41
 In the Calvo model’s output gap regression, the coefficient on the monetary shock is 0.495 
(0.017) and that on lagged output is 0.848 (0.010). The Calvo model predictably implies an 
overly strong positive correlation between the size of the price change and the time it was last 
reset. And the extensive margin of aggregate prices is completely absent.  
42
 Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) analyse in more detail the policy implications of making the 
timing of reviews endogenous. 
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In their different ways, Midrigan (2011), Nakamura and Steinsson 
(2008), Woodford (2009) and Gertler and Leahy (2008) all find that monetary 
non-neutrality is a feature of models based on sound micro-foundations for 
price stickiness. I reach the same conclusion without invoking any 
heterogeneity in menu costs, kurtosis in productivity shocks or scope 
economies in re-pricing. Each of these may also be important additional 
reasons for a weak selection effect to generate monetary non-neutrality. But 
even in their absence, monetary policy will also matter in a world where it is 
costly both to review prices and to change them.  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Golosov and Lucas (2007) have challenged the view that infrequent price 
adjustment by firms explains why money has aggregate real output effects. 
The basis of their challenge is the ‘selection effect’ – re-setting firms are not 
selected at random, they are those firms whose prices are furthest from their 
equilibrium levels and who therefore make substantial adjustments when their 
prices are changed. Like Caplin and Spulber (1987), Golosov and Lucas show 
how the aggregate price level can be sufficiently flexible to neutralize the real 
effects of money even when firms change their prices infrequently because of 
menu costs. 
The Golosov and Lucas critique is an important one. New-Keynesians 
have justified their assumption of price rigidity by an appeal to the costs of 
changing them. The presence of a strong selection effect in menu-cost 
models implies that the new-Keynesian analysis of monetary policy still lacks 
a convincing micro-foundation. Unfortunately Golosov and Lucas base their 
argument on a model that fails to explain the wide dispersion of price 
28 
adjustments observed in the micro data and recently analysed in Klenow and 
Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Midrigan (2011). For 
example Klenow and Kryvtsov find that the mean absolute price change is 
around 10% but 44% of prices changes are less than 5% in absolute value. In 
the Golosov and Lucas model, small price changes simply do not occur.  
A number of papers have extended the standard model to explain the 
wide dispersion in price changes, and when they do so the selection effect is 
sufficiently weakened to restore the non-neutrality of money. Midrigan (2011), 
for example, assumes that productivity shocks have pronounced kurtosis and 
firms enjoy economies of scope, taking the opportunity to change all their 
prices when strict menu-cost considerations justify re-setting only one. These 
two extensions to the standard model weaken the selection effect and restore 
the real effects of money to a level close to that of the Calvo model. 
In this paper I incorporate Reis’s (2006) notion of rational inattentiveness 
into a standard menu-cost model and investigate the effects this has on 
monetary neutrality. I do this by assuming that price-setting involves two 
distinct costs: review costs (information gathering, processing, decision-
taking) and menu costs (the direct costs of physically changing prices). The 
standard menu-cost model (implicitly) assumes that reviews are continuous 
and costless – it is only costly to change prices. The micro data suggests 
otherwise. Price reviews are intermittent and far more costly than price 
adjustments. And they do not always lead firms to change their prices. Alvarez 
et al (2011) find that ‘the median firm in the Euro area reviews its price a bit 
less than three times a year, but changes its price only about once a year’. A 
similar pattern holds in US data. In my modified menu-cost model, when the 
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firm reviews its price it (i) decides whether or not to change it and by how 
much; and (ii) sets the date of the next review. Both decisions are state-
dependent, i.e. influenced by the firm’s inherited price, its current productivity 
and the state of the macro-economy. The selection effect in the modified 
model is sufficiently weak for the non-neutrality of money to be similar to that 
of a model with Calvo pricing. The Golosov and Lucas critique evaporates 
with one reasonable modification to the assumed price-setting process. 
 Table 1: Model Calibration 
 
  GL Review Cost Model 
 Data                1    7 Inattention 
       
Parameters common to all models     6;    2;    7;   0.9966;    0.0021;     0.0032 
       
Calibration Parameters       
k  0.0170 0.01740 0.01726 0.00842 0 
q  0 0.00870 0.01726 0.05894 0.0930 
ρ  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
  
 0.04 0.0547 0.0635 0.095 0.1170 
        
Calibration Targets       
Reset Frequency (%) 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 
Mean absolute price change (%) 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Price increases (% share) 64.8 66.9 65.4 64.7 62.7 64.6 
Ratio of mean to median 1.165 1.030 1.098 1.120 1.164 1.264 
       
 
Notes: Parameters that are common to all models are based on those adopted by Golosov 
and Lucas (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The three (independent) calibration 
parameters in the first column (k,   and   ) were chosen to match the price re-set frequency, 
mean absolute size of price change and the percentage of price changes that are increases. 
    matches the ratio of the mean to median of absolute price changes and this is the 
benchmark model. 
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Table 2: Pricing Behaviour 
 
  GL Review Cost Model 
 Data         0.5    1    7 Inattention 
       
Review and Re-set Intervals       
Mean Review Interval (months) - 1 3.977 4.995 8.25 11.55 
Max-Min Review Interval 
(months) 
- 1-1 4-3 5-4 9-4 14-3 
Standard Deviation of Review 
Intervals (months) 
- - 0.151 0.071 0.77 3.71 
Reviews that change price (%) - 100 34.7 43.3 71.7 97.7 
Standard Deviation of Reset 
Intervals (months) 
5.2 - 7.0 10.3 9.5 8.5 6.6 4.38 
       
Absolute Price Changes       
    Percent < 5%  KK         44 
M           25 
0.10 2.10 5.13 23.36 36.81 
1   
- -0.232 -0.165 -0.109 -0.132 -0.385 
       
Notes: The results reported in this table are based on the simulated pricing behaviour of 5,000 
firms over 2,000 months.   is the correlation between the absolute size of price change and the 
time since last set. 
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Table 3: Aggregate Implications 
 GL Review Cost Model 
         0.5         7 Inattention 
      
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz Aggregate  
 tclog  
     
        0  -0.340 
(0.003) 
-0.306 
(0.003) 
-0.282 
(0.004) 
-0.191 
(0.003) 
-0.150 
(0.003) 
        1   
0.650 
(0.004) 
0.685 
(0.003) 
0.711 
(0.004) 
0.805 
(0.003) 
0.847 
(0.003) 
        2  
0.298 
(0.001) 
0.394 
(0.002) 
0.407 
(0.002) 
0.433 
(0.002) 
0.441 
(0.002) 
        e  
0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
        R
2 
0.975 0.980 0.972 0.986 0.986 
2  (KK = 0.25) 0.617 0.541 0.421 0.276 0.039 
3  (KK = 0.99) 0.992 0.994 0.957 0.994 0.992 
g  (%) 
0.107 0.181 0.219 0.343 0.466 
      
Output Gap Regression      
         1tg  0.530 
(0.007) 
0.599    
(0.009) 
0.641    
(0.010) 
0.575 
(0.015) 
0.448 
(0.019) 
       )log( twd  0.263 
(0.002) 
0.386   
(0.005) 
0.406   
(0.007) 
0.443 
(0.020) 
0.459 
(0.025) 
       
Notes: The results reported in the table are based on simulated aggregations over 5,000 firms 
for 2,000 months.    is the correlation between the inflation rate and the fraction of prices 
being reset.    is the correlation between the inflation rate and the mean change in those 
prices which are being reset.    is the standard deviation of the output gap.  
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Figure 1: Distributions of Non-zero Price Changes 
 
 
Figure 2: Output Gap Impulse Responses 
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